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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
The Supreme Court of the United States is tasked with deciding to grant 
or deny a petition for certiorari for over 7,000 cases per year, totaling an average 
-week term.1 This volume of cases 
submitted to the Court has risen dramatically over the last century. In 1900, the 
Court saw 406 cert petitions.2 By 1950, that number grew to 1,195. By 1975, it 
1 About the Supreme Court, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2020). 
2 Federal Judicial Caseloads, 1789–2016, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/supreme-court-caseloads-1880-2015 (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2020). 
1
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was nearly 4,000.3 increase to as 
many as 20,000 by 2070.4 Even with the numbers as they are today, the Supreme 
5
However, the effective use of judicial maximalism by appellate courts 
may decrease these numbers. A maximalist judge can be described generally as 
answering the important questions and rendering broad enough decisions to 
provide guidance to lower courts and litigants regarding factually similar, though 
not identical, disputes. Minimalism, on the other hand, is a case-by-case 
approach that looks only to the specific set of facts before it and crafts a decision 
narrowly tailored to those unique facts.6 In some circumstances, a minimalist 
path-of-least-resistance may be necessary to avoid unintended consequences that 
may follow a broad decision. In other circumstances, this case-by-case approach 
leaves questions unanswered and provides more opportunity in the future for 
litigation on the same topic, thus burdening lower courts with more litigation 
and, in turn, laying the foundation for more disputes to reach 
doors.7
The hypothesis proposed in this Note is as follows: Minimalism is 
appropriate, and even important, in some areas of the law; however, maximalism 
is the better approach when other actors outside of the judiciary rely on the 
. For example, when police officers, 
health care providers, and other actors outside of the judiciary are involved, 
maximalism should be embraced. As such, this Note discusses the effects of 
judicial minimalism  and maximalism over topics such as 
3 See id. 
4  This prediction is based on 50-year intervals starting at 406 cases in 1900, increasing to 
1,195 cases in 1950, and a final statistic of approximately 7,000 cases in 2000. Aside from rounding 
the 7,852 cases filed in 2000 down to 7,000, this simple model does not take into account the recent 
decrease in the number of cert petitions filed after 2006. Therefore, the 20,000-case estimate is 
likely on the upper end of the realistic scale. 
5  Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 
(2009). Grove s solution is maximalism all the time: The Court must therefore make the most of 
the cases it does hear by issuing broad (maximal) decisions that guide lower courts in the many 
cases that it lacks the capacity to review. Id. This Note s solution is maximalism in two particular 
contexts: (1) mini-maximalism, which is the use of maximalism after minimalism has run its 
course, and (2) when actors outside of the judiciary are involved. 
6 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME ix x (1999) [hereinafter ONE CASE]; 
see also Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the 
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1952 (2005). 
7  Shallow decisions coming from the Court often leave issues undecided and give little to no 
underlying explanation for the decision itself. ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 17. Sunstein says the 
ultimate shallow decisions rest in the decision to deny certiorari. Id. 
2
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physician-assisted suicide and the new state challenges to Roe v. Wade.8 This 
Note shows, through an analysis of cases, that minimalism should only be a 
starting point. Eventually, a more definite and broadly applicable answer is 
necessary. The switch from minimalism to maximalism can and should occur 
through other 
experimental means. 
This Note also takes quick aim at analyzing the effects of the theory on 
lower courts and other actors. Maximalism is particularly more appropriate when 
actors outside of the judicial process are involved. For example, in its Fourth 
Amendment case law, the Supreme Court itself has recognized the importance 
of bright-line rules which guide law enforcement officers.9 There are many other 
factors that must be considered when a court makes a decision, and minimalism 
should only be leaned on when agreement is nearly impossible. 
The purpose of this Note is not to argue for or against the validity of the 
theory of judicial minimalism, but instead, this Note assumes minimalism is a 
valid theory that appellate courts abide by before discussing the repercussions of 
those minimalist or maximalist choices. This Note accepts that minimalism may 
be appropriate for some areas of the law.10 However, courts cannot always hide 
o the 
11 For example, maximalist decisions are appropriate and 
work. Roe v. Wade is just one example. Legislatures, health care professionals, 
and women need clear guidance when it comes to abortion options. 
This Note has both a descriptive and prescriptive component. Taking 
behavior in Part II,12 this Note then analyzes when courts should rely on 
maximalism in Part III.13 Additionally, Part III of this Note argues that 
-growing caseload.14
This Note also applies this solution and asks whether, in light of the recent 
challenges to a seemingly maximalist opinion in Roe v. Wade, another 
maximalist decision is necessary to settle the field.15 This Note does not argue 
8  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
9 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
10  Minimalism is appropriate when a Court is addressing an issue of first impression. See infra 
Part III.B. Sunstein suggests minimalism is also appropriate when the Court is dealing with a 
constitutional issue of high complexity about which many people feel deeply and on which the 
nation is divided (on moral or other grounds).  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 5. 
11 Id. at 4. 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part III. 
15  Yes, another maximalist decision may be necessary. See infra Section III.C. 
3
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that a maximalist decision intended to resolve a particular issue is meant to be 
. It only argues that taking a 
maximalist approach, when necessary, positively affects subsequent case law 
and lower courts. 
II. BACKGROUND: DEFINING MINIMALISM
Judicial minimalism16 is a phrase unfamiliar to most new law students, 
yet most students could probably discuss the concept after completing just one 
semester. Most generally, a minimalist judge decides the case before her, as 
final 
17 Minimalists are the detail oriented, quiet observers in the back of 
the room, only speaking when necessary.18 Even when they do speak, they 
address as little as possible to only resolve the situation at hand.19
The art of saying just enough to justify an outcome, in theory, reduces 
the judicial decision-making burden and decreases the likelihood of judicial 
error.20 - 21
When a new, broad, or bright-line rule is necessary in a case, minimalists may 
[the] rule by adopting a minimalist approach: 
defining the rule narrowly to encompass only the factual circumstances before 
16  Professor Cass R. Sunstein, the Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard Law 
School, coined the phrase judicial minimalism and has written a book and many articles defining 
and describing the idea. Biography: Cass R. Sunstein, HARV. L. SCH., 
https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10871/Sunstein (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). For some of his 
works, see ONE CASE, supra note 6 and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA 
L. REV. 825 (2008) [hereinafter Beyond Minimalism]. But see Grove, supra note 5, at 10 ( I also 
want to underscore that the distinction between minimalism and vertical maximalism is a matter 
of degree and not of kind. Neither approach to opinion writing can easily be reduced to precise 
definition. Instead, both constitute general approaches to decision making.  (emphasis added). 
17  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at ix; see also Grove, supra note 5, at 6 ( Minimalist opinions are 
both narrow, in that they resolve only the case at hand, and shallow, in that they decline to offer a 
broad theoretical justification for that holding.  (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations 
omitted). 
18 See Siegel, supra note 6, at 1954 ( Minimalists say no more than necessary,  Professor 
Sunstein urges, resolv[ing] the largest issues of the day . . . as narrowly as possible,  and requiring 
[a]bove all . . . procedures that are lawful, proper and fair. ) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed, 
The Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004 (§ 4), at 9). 
19  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at ix x ( A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves 
many things undecided . . . . It seeks to decide cases on narrow grounds. ). 
20 Id. at 4. 
21  Grove, supra note 5, at 6. 
4
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[them] 22 e to make 
their own rules of law.  23
A minimalist court can be defined as follows: 
It knows that there is much that it does not know; it is intensely 
aware of its own limitations. It seeks to decide cases on narrow 
grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions. Alert to the 
problem of unanticipated consequences, it sees itself as part of a 
system of democratic deliberation; it attempts to promote the 
democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and 
responsiveness. It allows continued space for democratic 
reflection from Congress and the states. It wants to 
accommodate new judgments about facts and values. To the 
extent that it can, it seeks to provide rulings that can attract 
support from people with diverse theoretical commitments.24
In short, 
25 The most distinctive 
26 ument, he suggests that 
along certain 
dimensions 27
The simplest example of minimalism in the Supreme Court is the denial 
of certiorari without comment.28 This act is an assertion a judgment from the 
Court without an opinion. The assertion is as narrow as it can be. Dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari indicates a maximalist Justice.29 Dissenting is 
unnecessary, as it is only dicta, and provides an opinion when one is not required. 
This simple example exemplifies the differences between minimalists and 
maximalists.30
22 Id. at 3. 
23  Id.
24  Siegel, supra note 6, at 1954 (quoting ONE CASE, supra note 6, at ix x). 
25  Tara Smith, Reckless Causation: The Perils of Judicial Minimalism, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 347, 349 (2010). 
26  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at x. 
27 Id. at 19. 
28  Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial 
Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 1045, 1070 71 (2009). 
29 Id. at 1071. 
30 Id. 
5
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It is worth noting that justices that disagree doctrinally can be on the 
same side of the minimalist/maximalist divide.31 This means that minimalism 
affects the opinion in a case and not the judgment.32
underlying justification and reasoning for a judgment with an eye on the future.33
It is opinions, and not judgments, that can be affected by minimalism or 
maximalism.34 Minimalists are concerned with the scope of an opinion.35
36 in an opinion, to reduce the 
subsequent applicability of its determination to a later case.37
Judicial minimalism is not a perfect theory. It is certainly more 
appropriate in some cases than in others. Sunstein has outlined five factors that 
indicate when minimalism may succeed, and four factors which indicate that 
maximalism may be more appropriate. Washington v. Glucksberg38 exemplifies 
the effective use of minimalism. 
31 See id. at 1076. Justices can be minimalists or maximalists. Id. at 1053. Anderson 
distinguishes between minimalism in a constitutional and non-constitutional context. See id. at 
1067 68. However, these classifications are not permanent, at times varying based on the type of 
case, whether constitutional or non-constitutional, before them. Id. at 1068. Anderson argues that 
in non-constitutional cases, [t]he difference between judgments and opinions is much smaller.
Id. at 1088. 
  The attraction of minimalism to a wide range of justices seemingly offers the exact kind of 
neutrality that adjudication should offer.  Smith, supra note 25, at 350. However, this may also 
indicate that something is amiss.  Id. at 350 (arguing that minimalism is so broad that the core 
idea of Minimalism is completely untenable ). Minimalism has not gone without criticism. See, 
e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2007); Sheldon 
Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297 (2001); Christopher J. 
Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000); Saikrishna 
Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left Wing Law Professors are Wrong for 
America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207 (2006). 
32 Id. at 1055 (demonstrating how Anderson distinguishes between minimalist judges 
outputting judgments  and opinions ). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 1075. 
36  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 10. 
37  The author pauses for a moment to note that a similar theory to the theory of judicial 
minimalism, an analysis of rules versus standards, may produce the same effects on lower courts. 
For a discussion on the rules versus standards theory, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: 
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557 (1992). For a discussion on how that theory may 
affect judicial minimalism, see Anderson, supra note 28, at 1083 (2009) (suggesting that the rules-
standards analysis is perhaps just a special case  of the minimalism-maximalism analysis). A 
justice s preferences for rules versus standards may affect the scope of an opinion similarly to how 
a minimalist justice would decide scope. Even Sunstein noted the similarity. See ONE CASE, supra
note 6, at 41 42. 
38  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
6
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A. Why Judicial Minimalism Makes Sense 
what judicial minimalism is, but why should appellate courts 
care? Sunstein proffers four reasons why judicial minimalism is needed.39 First, 
minimalism is helpful because it welcomes agreement when the Court cannot 
reach a consensus.40
theless allows the Court to 
issue a decision without the judges coming to an agreement.41 Therefore, 
unanimous decisions are often minimalist42 because they provide a judgment 
without a helpful opinion. These opinions are often led by phrasing such as 
the future. 
Second, minimalism can be used because the Court lacks relevant 
information.43 Third, and perhaps most importantly for minimalist justices 
concerned with making the right judgment for this case and later cases, 
minimalism is appropriate when the Court is unsure of the implications tied to 
deciding the case one way or the other.44
Fourth, which is affected by the third factor, the Court may engage in 
minimalism because it in good faith believes that democracy is more suited to 
decide the issue.45 This minimalist idea allows other branches of government as 
well as the American people ,
allow other means of resolution or context for future cases.46 Lastly, the Court 
may choose minimalism if a clear rule or wide, deep ruling has the potential to 
47 Despite Alexander 
the Supreme Court as the weakest branch, the Supreme Court actually 
48
Thus, extending what Sunstein suggests, deciding a case using a maximalist 
39  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 53 54. 
40 Id. at 53. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 
(2006). 
41  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 18. 
42  Anderson, supra note 28, at 1072. 
43  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 53. 
44 Id. at 53 54. 
45 Id. at 54. 
46 See id. at 54 55. 
47 Id. at 54. 
48  Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court 
Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 787 (1999). 
7
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approach, rather than a minimalist one, without the support of the people could 
49
Now that the reasons behind minimalism have been outlined, it is 
important to understand situations which indicate to the justices when 
minimalism should be used, according to Sunstein. There are four delineated 
situations in which the Court might engage in judicial minimalism effectively: 
Minimalism becomes more attractive (1) when judges are 
proceeding in the midst of (constitutionally relevant) factual or 
moral uncertainty and rapidly changing circumstances, (2) when 
any solution seems likely to be confounded by future case, (3) 
when the need for advance planning does not seem insistent, and 
(4) when the preconditions for democratic self-government are 
not at stake and democratic goals are likely to be promoted by a 
rule-bound judgment. 50
In general, the more complex an issue is and the more people who feel 
deeply about a divisive issue, the more likely minimalism will be an effective 
path for judges to take.51 Additionally, the states are important actors in the 
political system, and minimalism allows room for their deliberation in the 
democratic process.52
B. A Minimalist Decision in Effect 
One instance that illustrates the effect of minimalist decision making is 
when the Supreme Court was presented the question of whether it should 
recognize education as a fundamental right. San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez53 is a minimalist decision because it was democracy-
promoting54 and left room for other actors outside of the judiciary to do the work. 
Rodriguez was an equal protection case decided after Brown v. Board of 
Education,55 but this time the Court declined to recognize a fundamental right to 
education under the Fourteenth Amendment.56 The Court was asked to decide if 
49 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
393 (1857); ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 59. Though, I do agree with Sunstein that [u]sually it 
would be much better to have a just outcome, rejected by many people, than an unjust outcome 
with which all or most agree. Beyond Minimalism, supra note 16, at 841. 
50  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 57. 
51 Id. at 5. 
52 See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS (2018). 
53  411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
54 See ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 24 25. 
55  349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
56 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
8
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education was protected under the Constitution.57 At the time of this case, there 
was such a disparity between the income of schools that the states sought to solve 
the problem themselves, perhaps in light of Brown.58 The disparity among the 
funding for several Texas schools was often related to race and was heightened 
ived the worst (or at least the lowest-
59 The plaintiffs sought to require a more uniform funding 
system in the state of Texas under the Equal Protection Clause.60
The Court in Rodriguez could have either decided the case under strict 
scrutiny or rational basis.61 Not surprisingly, the Court chose rational basis, the 
minimalist choice.62 This allowed the Court to defer to the State if the funding 
policy was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.63
While the Federal Government allowed such a minimalist answer, many 
states took action on their own to mitigate the problem.64 Rodriguez was different 
from other minimalist decisions because the Court chose to allow other routes of 
democracy to take flight rather than to take over itself.65 Before Rodriguez was 
decided even at the district court, the Texas Legislature unsuccessfully attempted 
for two years to reform funding legislation to lessen the problem.66 After 
Rodriguez, states were left on their own to create a system that would promote 
equity in school funding regimes.67
57 Id. at 33. 
58 See SUTTON, supra note 52, at 22 23. 
59 Id. at 23. 
60 See id. at 22 23. But see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 57 (finding no more than a random 
probability that racial minorities were concentrated in lower funded districts). 
61  SUTTON, supra note 52, at 24. 
62  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 26 ( Cautious judges can promote democratic deliberation with 
more minimalist strategies, designed to bracket some of the deeper questions but also to ensure 
both accountability and reflection. Many minimalist decisions attempt to ensure more in the way 
of democracy and more in the way of deliberation. ). As Sutton puts it, Rodriguez tolerated the 
continuation of a funding system that allowed serious disparities in the quality of the education 
children received based solely on the wealth of the community in which their parents happened to 
live or could afford to live. SUTTON, supra note 52, at 27. 
63 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40. 
64 See id.
65 See ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 27 ( [S]ome decisions are democracy-promoting because 
they try to trigger or improve processes of democratic deliberation. Minimalist courts can provide 
spurs and prods to promote democratic deliberation itself. ). 
66  SUTTON, supra note 52, at 25. 
67 Id. at 3. 
9
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In analyzing the unique situation after Rodriguez, it is important to note 
that states have the power to create systems of public schools.68 This power 
allowed them to draft around or provide further protection for education.69
Additionally, the legislatures were a larger part of the post-Rodriguez movement 
than were the lower courts.70 The legislatures experimented with fairer funding 
systems for longer than what would have been necessary if the Rodriguez Court 
had issued a maximalist decision outlining what was required under the Equal 
Protection Clause for fair funding. 
Rodriguez showcases the increased workload among lower 
governmental entities caused by a minimalist decision. While the state 
legislatures were doing more work as a result of Rodriguez, the lower courts also 
kept busy.71 These lower level lawsuits focused on the Equal Protection Clause 
but also addressed alleged violations of state constitutions.72 As Sixth Circuit 
Judge and author Jeffery Sutton -five States by now 
have faced state-constitutional challenges to their system of funding public 
73 These cases and legislative enactments were largely due to the 
Rodriguez, which forced the states to take action. 
C. When Minimalism Does Not Make Sense 
Sometimes, minimalism is not the means to the end, but maximalism 
may be. So, how is a maximalist different from a minimalist? Maximalists seek 
to publish opinions that will create strong precedent so judges sitting in lower 
courts or on subsequent cases have a guidepost.74 As a result of this, maximalists 
tend to have a stronger adherence to stare decisis and more easily allow a 
previous decision to encompass the case at hand.75 This is contrasted to 
minimalists who seem to have a keen eye for dicta, which may lead to decisions 
on a case-by-case basis.76 In some circumstances, maximalism is a more suitable 
approach for an appellate court: 
[I]t is worthwhile to attempt a broad and deep solution (1) when 
judges have considerable confidence in the merits of that 
68  In looking at early state constitutions, many States amended their constitutions, requiring 
the legislature . . . to create a thorough and efficient  system of public schools.  Id. at 27. 
69 See id. at 29. 
70 See id. at 37. 




75 See id. at 20. 
76 See id. 
10
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solution, (2) when the solution can reduce costly uncertainty for 
future courts and litigants, (3) when advance planning is 
important, and (4) when a maximalist approach will promote 
democratic goals either by creating the preconditions for 
democracy or by imposing good incentives on elected officials, 
incentives to which they are likely to be responsive.77
maximalism,
use it often.78 Under vertical maximalism, higher courts have a duty to issue rules 
that govern lower courts.79 The theory rests on the current structure of the judicial 
80 The 
judicial system is a hierarchy under Article III of the Constitution and the 
Supremacy Clause.81 The higher up in the hierarchy, the more important broad 
decisions become.82 But, it has not always been this way.83
84
this is not the case today.85 The role of an appellate court in a system of vertical 
86 As this approach indicates, vertical maximalism is not a 
substitute for the democratic process.87 Instead, even maximalist courts can 
defer to the political branches. 88 This allows the Supreme Court to maintain its 
role as a guide while maintaining the legitimacy of the democratic process.89
77  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 57 (emphasis added). 
78  Grove, supra note 5, at 3. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 4 (quotations omitted). 
81 Id. at 3. 
82 Id. 
83  Id. at 4. 
84  Id.
85 See supra Part I. 
86  Grove, supra note 5, at 3. 
87 Id. ( The Court may, under the approach offered here, issue rulings that require all lower 
courts to defer to the political branches (such as when it concludes that economic regulations are 
subject to rational basis scrutiny or that courts must defer to an agency s reasonable construction 
of an ambiguous statute).  (footnotes omitted). 
88 Id. at 1. 
89 See id. at 4. 
11
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1. Successful Maximalist Decisions 
The best maximalist case to date, according to Sunstein,90 comes from 
the Warren Court: Brown v. Board of Education.91 Although known as a 
landmark case for desegregation, Brown was not the first decision by the Court 
addressing the issue. Rather, there were ample historical cases that sufficiently 
lead up to Brown
92
Plessy v. Ferguson93 was the first attempt by the Court to address the 
issue. The Court upheld a separate but equal standard, an arguably maximalist 
decision.94 But even at the time Plessy was decided, Justice John M. Harlan 
warned the C opinion, the judgment this day rendered 
will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal 
95 Plessy was not supported by historical context, so it 
failed.96 Following Plessy and leading up to Brown were a series of four 
minimalist decisions,97 each leaning further away from Plessy and setting the 
stage nicely for Brown.98 These four cases rested in the separate-but-equal 
context but began to dissolve racial separation.99
90  ONE CASE, supra note 6, at xiii. 
91  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
92  Benjamin H. Kizer, The Impact of Brown v. Board of Education, 2 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1967). 
93  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
94  By upholding the separate but equal doctrine, the Court espoused a rule of broad application 
for all other lower courts to follow. This typifies the maximalist approach. 
95 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
96  Chris Edelson, Judging in a Vacuum, or, Once More, Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia’s
Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors Made in Plessy v. Ferguson, 45 AKRON L. REV. 513, 520 
(2012) ( Plessy suffered from its refus[al] to confront the social meaning of segregation and its 
harm to black Americans. . . . In other words, the Plessy Court failed to take relevant social and 
historical context into account. ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
97  Motley identifies four pre-Brown cases, which she calls foundations rulings : Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), and 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Hon. Constance Baker Motley, The Historical Setting of 
Brown and Its Impact on the Supreme Court’s Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 9 (1992). This 
note identifies these cases as minimalist because the courts only decided the case before it, and the 
cases had weak precedential values. 
98  Motley, supra note 97. 
99 See, e.g., McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642 ( We hold that under these circumstances the 
Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the state based upon race. ).
12
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Fifty-eight years after Plessy, the historical context had matured100 with 
the help of these minimalist decisions, and Brown was rightfully decided. In fact, 
just four years after Brown was decided, it was reaffirmed in Cooper v. Aaron.101
As Siegel described Brown and the case s historical context, the Justices 
step[ped] up and forcefully expound[ed] the fundamental law regardless of how 
polarizing [the] issue may be. 102 Because the Court boldly and broadly decided 
Brown as it did, Brown is a maximalist decision. 
Brown was certainly followed by what Kizer calls minor legal 
quakes, 103 including Brown II.104 Over 2,500 cases have cited Brown since the 
Court decided the case in 1954.105 Thirty-one of those cases have received 
negative treatment;106 that is approximately 1%. However, Brown is now 
accepted as among the most followed Supreme Court decisions to date. 
2. Failed Maximalist Decisions 
In the context of deciding if a rule or a standard is more appropriate, 
Professor Louis Kaplow determined that whether a lower decision will 
constitute a precedent affects the degree of effort an adjudicator should expend 
in giving content to a standard. 107 Taking this idea and applying it to the 
minimalist argument, a factor in determining if minimalism is appropriate is the 
ease of acceptance among lower courts and litigants. If a maximalist decision is 
likely to be followed, then a maximalist approach should be taken. This seems 
circular in a sense, but consider cases in the Supreme Court s history where 
maximalism was not appropriate, yet was used, and the result was not favorable. 
Two prime examples of the limits of maximalism are Dred Scott v. Sanford108
and Lochner v. New York.109
100  Motley, supra note 97 (discussing World War II as a necessary predicate to ending racial 
segregation by state governments ).
101  358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
102  Siegel, supra note 6, at 1953. 
103  Kizer, supra note 92, at 1 (internal quotations omitted). 
104  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
105  According to Westlaw s Citing References.
106  According to Westlaw s Negative Treatment.
107  Kaplow, supra note 37, at 583. 
108  60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
109  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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The Dred Scott decision is notoriously one of the worst in the history of 
the Supreme Court.110 The 1875 decision denied Scott citizenship and access to 
the courts because of his African descent. 111 The Court went on, deciding more 
than arguably necessary, to hold that the Missouri Compromise was 
unconstitutional.112
Dred Scott was decided in the years leading up to the Civil War. Actors 
in the historical context of Scott did not agree. The majority of the Court was 
compromised of five southern justices.113 Unfortunately, these justices were on 
the losing side of history. Hagan argues that two letters effected the outcome of 
the Dred Scott case.114 These letters revealed that the President-elect, James 
Buchanan, and the Court had discussed the concerns that Dred Scott would soon 
raise.115 The first letter, written from an agent of the Court to Buchanan directly, 
informed Buchanan that the case was going to be decisive one way or the other.116
Additional letters, coming from both Southerners and Northerners, shed 
light on the anxious nature of the people to address this question. In that sense, 
the issue was ready to be decided.117 However, not enough actors in the historical 
context agreed upon what the outcome should be. Because the Court was urged 
to make a decision, it did so at an inappropriate time. The Court should have 
maintained its original view118 and avoided deciding the validity of the Missouri 
Compromise. The use of maximalism in Scott was so destructive as to require a 
constitutional amendment to undo it.119
Lochner is also considered by some to be on the same shameful page of 
the Court s history as Scott.120 Pre-Lochner, and even for some time after, there 
was a great outpouring of regulatory legislation by the states and, early on to a 
lesser extent, the federal government. 121 States at the time regulated many areas 
of the economy including health and safety standards and inspections for 
110 See, e.g., Horace H. Hagan, The Dred Scott Decision, 15 GEO. L.J. 95, 95 (1927); see also
Jack M. Blakin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 49, 54 (2007). 
111 Scott, 60 U.S. at 397. 
112 Id. at 455. 
113  Hagan, supra note 110, at 96. 
114 Id. at 95. 
115 Id. at 96. 
116 Id. at 96 97. 
117 See, e.g., id. at 98. 
118 Id. at 96. 
119  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
120 See, e.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the “Political Economy” of Lochner 
v. New York, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 515, 516 (2005). 
121 Id. at 517 (internal citations omitted). 
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factories and mines, railroad safety regulations and rate fixing, maximum hours 
laws, minimum wage laws, limit on child labor, price fixing for goods and 
services, prohibitions on the production of alcoholic beverages, banking and 
insurance regulation,  and many more aspects of daily life in the workforce.122
Regulatory legislation was far from new when Lochner was decided in 1905.123
In 1904, Ernst Freund, an author of treatises often favoring state regulation, 
described the environment as a time of expansion, with state government having 
more incisive powers  than ever before.124
Lochner, however, does not reflect this expansion. The Court in Lochner
restricted state governments from regulating working hours and supported 
freedom of contract for workers and employers.125 The Court rejected the New 
York statute as an invalid exercise of police power,126 despite the apparent 
expansion of state regulatory power.127 Justice Holmes in his dissent even 
pointed out that [t]his case is decided upon an economic theory which a large 
part of the country does not entertain. 128 Less than 30 years after Lochner, the 
Court shifted from its failed maximalist decision in Nebbia v. New York.129 The 
Court this time upheld state price regulations based on economic policies.130
Nebbia was not quite the maximalist decision to steer all subsequent state 
regulatory cases, but it marked a shift in Supreme Court precedent more toward 
the leanings of the public and legislators at the time. The Court subsequently 
upheld a regulatory law in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish131 and upheld a similar 
law in United States v. Carolene Products,132 solidifying the shift away from 
Lochner.
The ultimate maximalist decision in the area of substantive due process 
and economic liberties is Williamson v. Lee Optical.133 The Williamson
122 Id. at 518. 
123 Id.
124 Id. ( Ernst Freund, a treatise writer not unfriendly to economic regulation under the states
police power, stated: A vast amount of police legislation is justified on this ground, and the state 
is readily conceded more incisive powers than despotic governments would have dared to claim in 
former times. ) (citing ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS 109 (1904)). 
125  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60 (1905). 
126 Id. at 61. 
127  Paul, supra note 120, at 518. 
128 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
129  291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
130  Id. at 537. 
131  300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
132  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
133  348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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conceivable rational relationship  test,134 though not a strict test, governs lower 
courts in the area of substantive due process and provides a framework for which 
subsequent litigation can be assessed and decided in an efficient and hopefully 
uniform manner. Under the fourth factor, which Sunstein identifies as an 
appropriate situation to use minimalism, the case is only minimalist because it 
leaves room for other actors in the democracy. Otherwise, Williamson acts as a 
maximalist decision and allows lower courts to apply a clear rule to a range of 
situations. 
III. ANALYSIS: EFFECTIVE USE OF MAXIMALISM
This Note does not advocate for courts to embrace maximalism all of the 
time like Tara Leigh Grove does in her call to action theory vertical 
maximalism.  However, maximalism is becoming more necessary to guide 
lower courts through their increasing case load.135 First, we must understand the 
differing effects of minimalism and maximalism on subsequent case law. When 
the Supreme Court issues a minimalist decision, it leaves a great deal undecided, 
in a way that frees up future decision-makers but also leaves them to some extent 
at sea. 136 This is more mud than crystal;137 does a minimalist decision create 
more or less work for lower courts? Does it increase or decrease the amount of 
subsequent case law on the subject? These answers are explored below and the 
following conclusion is reached: maximalism is necessary in two situations. 
First, appellate courts should issue maximalism decisions when an area of the 
law would benefit from a uniform approach and minimalism has previously been 
employed in the area. Second, maximalism is appropriate when there is a need 
to look to and rely on guidance from the judiciary. 
Put simply, minimalists have an appreciation and possibly a fear of
the potentially harmful effects of decisions that reach far beyond the case at 
hand. 138 On the other hand, maximalists are more confident that deciding a case 
based on deeper ground can be the correct and just way to proceed, both now and 
134 See id. at 491. 
135 See supra Part I. 
136 Beyond Minimalism, supra note 16, at 838; see also Grove, supra note 5, at 4 ( When the 
current Court instead issues a narrow, fact-bound (minimalist) decision, it leaves a great deal to be 
decided by the lower courts in future cases and thereby delegates its supreme law-declaration 
function to its judicial inferiors. ). 
137  This idea, that hard-edged rules  are like crystals and ambiguous rules of decision  are 
more like mud, comes from a law review article concerning property law but seems applicable in 
this context also. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 
(1988). 
138 Beyond Minimalism, supra note 16, at 827. 
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in the future.139 Sunstein puts it this way: as judicial confidence grows, perhaps 
because of extended experience, the argument for depth grows as well. 140
This Note comes to the conclusion that minimalist decisions create more 
work for lower courts and increase the need for subsequent case law. Eventually, 
a maximalist decision is warranted if other actors rely on the clear rules from the 
judiciary, even if that decision does not stand for centuries to come. Maximalist 
decisions are necessary to resolve subsequent legal questions in an efficient 
manner, especially when other actors  are involved in the carrying out of a 
maximalist decision.141 The laws of the United States do not allow indefiniteness 
in criminal statutes,142 so why should the rules be any different when interpreting
statutes and applying the law? 
A. Maximalism Is Appropriate When Other Actors Are Implicated 
Maximalism is a tool the judiciary can use to more effectively give 
power to its opinions and orders. The judiciary is not the weakest branch of the 
government.143 Therefore, it should not be afraid to give guidance to those 
seeking it. For example, police officers rely on Fourth Amendment case law 
during their day-to-day activities; similarly, abortion clinicians and others in the 
medical field rely on decisions of the judiciary. In cases that implicate other 
actors, the Court must take a maximalist approach and decree a clear rule which 
acts as a final resolution to maintain and increase its legitimacy. 
Minimalism causes indefinite rules of law. Without guiding principles, 
lower courts and other actors relying on clear rules are left to their own devices. 
It is unconstitutional in the criminal context for legislatures to enact indefinite 
criminal statutes.144 Though this has been interpreted loosely,145 why are we 
139 See id. at 840. 
140 Id. 
141 See infra Section III.A. 
142  United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ( The constitutional requirement of 
definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that 
no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand 
to be proscribed. ). 
143  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) for a contrary analysis. 
144 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a 
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated 
conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally 
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. ). 
145 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973); see also Robert E. Riggs, Miller v. 
California Revisited: An Empirical Note, 1981 BYU L. REV. 247, 257 (1981) ( In cases decided 
by the Supreme Court there is no dissent from the proposition that some degree of uncertainty is 
constitutionally tolerable. ).
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encouraging courts to act minimalistically?146 As previously discussed, 
minimalism is appropriately applied in some contexts. However, maximalism 
should be encouraged when other actors are frequently applying precedent and 
when minimalism has run its course. 
Three cases exemplify the importance of going beyond case-by-case 
decision making and embracing maximalism when necessary: Miller v. 
California,147 California v. Acevedo,148 and Roe v. Wade.149 In all three contexts, 
maximalism was intended to settle the law and prevent endless litigation 150 in 
these areas. The first two cases provide grounds for the effective use of 
maximalism through their effect on actors outside of the judiciary. In the third 
case, though outside actors are certainly implicated, the grounds for using 
maximalism lies in the mini-maximalism reasoning. Timing is what is important 
for a maximalist decision that may be needed to settle Roe.
1. Obscenity Law 
Movie makers, magazine publishers, artists, and store owners among 
others are affected by the judiciary s decisions in this area of the law. Before 
the Miller decision, the Court thought it nearly impossible to create a workable 
constitutional standard for obscene materials.151 In 1873, newly enacted 
obscenity laws banned obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy 152 materials, but it 
146 See Grove, supra note 5, at 1 ( Many prominent jurists and scholars, including those with 
outlooks as diverse as Chief Justice John Roberts and Cass Sunstein, have recently advocated a 
minimalist  approach to opinion writing at the Supreme Court. ).
147  413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
148  500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
149  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
150  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 620 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting United States 
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976)). 
151  Riggs, supra note 145, at 247. For a full history of obscenity law in American history, see 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex and the First Amendment: The Long and Winding History of Obscenity 
Law, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 134 (2019). Specifically, Justice Brennan expressed his disbelief 
in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton: no one definition, no matter how precisely or 
narrowly drawn, can possibly suffice for all situations, or carve out fully suppressible expression 
from all media without also creating a substantial risk of encroachment upon the guarantees of the 
Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.  413 U.S. 49, 83 85 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (footnote omitted). Brennan made this statement after writing his majority opinion in 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Before Roth, courts relied on old English obscenity 
case law. Riggs, supra note 145, at 248. 
152  Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873). 
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did not define those terms. 153 In 1913, the standard changed, defining obscene
materials in the eye of the law to mean the present critical point in the 
compromise between candor and shame at which the community may have 
arrived here and now. 154 But this definition was not universal and states began 
to experiment to come up with a coherent meaning  for the legal concept of 
obscenity. 155
When the Supreme Court addressed the issue in 1957 in its decision in 
Roth v. United States,156 it held that obscene materials were not protected under 
the First Amendment.157 It did, in a maximalist fashion, set forth another standard 
for determining what materials were legally considered obscene : the 
government can censor such materials only if the material, judged as a whole, 
appeals primarily to the prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive to 
contemporary community standards, and lacks any redeeming social value. 158
Roth changed the direction of obscenity case law.159 But even this approach was 
not satisfactory;160 The Court s inability to articulate a clear definition of 
obscenity led to an era of chaos and confusion. 161 Justice Stewart s famous 
phrase for determining if material is obscene describes the lack of direction well: 
That s it, that s it. I know it when I see it. 162
153  Stone, supra note 151, at 137. During this time, [m]aterial was deemed obscene if it had 
even the potential to corrupt an impressionable adolescent. Id. Enforcement boiled down to this: 
ny reference to sex in this era was unlawful. Id. at 138. 
154 Id. at 138 (citing United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)). 
155 Id. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that Theodore Dreiser s
acclaimed masterpiece An American Tragedy was obscene because it included a scene in which 
the main character visits a house of prostitution and another in which the main character and his 
pregnant girlfriend attempt to secure an abortion. Id. at 138 39 (citing Commonwealth v. Friede, 
171 N.E. 472 (Mass. 1930)). 
156  354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
157  Stone, supra note 151, at 139 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 
158 Id.
159 Roth replaced the standard of the most susceptible members of a potential audience with 
the standard of the average person, applying contemporary community stands.  Riggs, supra note 
145, at 249 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489). 
160 See id. at 250 ( No one regarded this doctrinal anarchy as a satisfactory state of affairs, and 
it was ultimately terminated by Miller v. California . . .  (internal citation omitted)). 
161  Stone, supra note 151, at 140. 
162 Id. at 140 (citing BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 239 (1979)); see 
also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ( I shall not today 
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand 
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see 
it . . . ). 
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This era of confusion and lack of guidance ended with Chief Justice 
Burger s appointment to the Court.163 In 1973, the Court in Miller164 issued new 
guidance to determine what constituted obscene materials.165 This new test, the 
utterly without redeeming social value test, 166 allowed materials to be legally 
obscene if a court concluded the following: 
the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals 
to the prurient interest; that the work depicts or describes sexual 
conduct in a patently offensive manner; and that the work, taken 
as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value. 167
Though obscenity is a rarely litigated issue today,168 Miller was the 
maximalist decision that settled the law in this area. Miller, through its five 
Justice majority, pointed to the need for agreement on a more specific and 
concrete definition  in the area of obscenity law.169 At this point, minimalism 
and the strategy of determining obscene materials had run its course. Minimalism 
was no longer allowing states to address the problem efficiently. The use of 
maximalism in issuing the Miller social value test appropriately defined 
obscenity for other actors to sufficiently follow precedent. The Court explicitly 
pointed out this intentional issuance of a broad rule. According to the Court in 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,170 Miller sought to clarify the constitutional 
definition of obscene material subject to regulation by the States. 171 The 
163 See Stone, supra note 151, at 141.
164 Miller s companion case was Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
165  Riggs, supra note 145, at 250. The new guideline set forth in Miller is as follows: 
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards  would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) 
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted). 
166  Stone, supra note 151, at 142. 
167 Id. (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24) (emphasis added). 
168 [T]he Department of Justice filed fewer than ten adult obscenity prosecutions between 
2001 and 2005. Id. at 142 43. By the early years of [the] twenty-first century, . . . we had for all 
practical purposes reached the end of obscenity. Id. at 143. 
169  Riggs, supra note 145, at 250. 
170  413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973). 
171 Id.
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surprising, and perhaps unintended,172 flexibility of this delineated rule allowed 
Miller to stand through shifting societal and cultural values.173
Miller still stands as good law today and continues to protect children 
from obscene materials.174 The narrowing of obscenity law comes not from 
judicial decision, but from society and technology changing.175 Miller
sufficiently withstood these changes showing that maximalism can stand the test 
of time. Though Justice Brennan s critiques176 are sufficiently noted, the chilling 
effect that would have resulted from a minimalist decision instead of Miller
would have only been worse. The Court s attempt at a definition of obscene  in 
Miller was a better guide to lower courts and other actors than a narrow decision 
would have been. 
2. The Fourth Amendment 
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment implicates actors outside of the 
judiciary namely the police force. The judiciary s interpretation of the warrant 
requirement, among others, directly effects how police officers carry out their 
work. For example, with the invention of new technologies, the Court ultimately 
determines what level of privacy a citizen enjoys.177 Justice John M. Harlan II, 
in his dissent in United States v. White178 stated that [t]he magnitude of the issue 
at hand is evidenced not simply by the obvious doctrinal difficulty of weighing 
such activity in the Fourth Amendment balance, but also, and more importantly, 
by the prevalence of police utilization of this technique. 179 In general, the early 
172  Chief Justice Burger wrote the Miller opinion, and he loathed pornography.  Stone, supra
note 151, at 141. 
173 Id. at 142 ( [C]ommunity standards soon became more tolerant of what would once have 
been regarded as patently offensive  depictions of sex, and the real-world definition of obscenity 
shrank down to a small fraction of what had once been thought to be obscene. ). 
174 Id. at 143 44. 
175 See id. at 143 ( Compared to the 1950s, when any depiction of sex in books, movies, or 
magazines was tightly constrained, we are now inundated with all sorts of sexually explicit 
material. ).
176  Justice Brennan made his critiques known in his Paris dissent. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). His three main critiques are as follows: (1) the 
lack of fair notice, (2) the chill on protected expression, and (3) stress imposed on the state and 
federal judicial machinery.  Riggs, supra note 145, at 252 (quoting Paris, 413 U.S. at 93). 
177 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (cellphone); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (thermal imaging device); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) 
(radio transmitter). 
178  401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
179 Id. at 770 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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Supreme Court addressed Fourth Amendment concerns on a case-by-case 
basis.180
More recently, the Court recognized the problem with this decision-
making strategy. It recognized in California v. Acevedo181 that unclear rules and 
narrow case law has led to confusion for law enforcement officers. 182 After this 
revelation, the Court in Acevedo overturned the old rule, which failed to protect 
privacy but also had confused courts and police officers and impeded effective 
law enforcement. 183 The Court plainly stated, [w]e conclude that it is better to 
adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant 
requirement for closed containers  as set forth in a previous Fourth Amendment 
case.184 Acevedo presented a seemingly narrow issue,185 yet it marked a quantum 
change in the Court s attitude toward the warrant requirement. 186
Before Acevedo, two cases created a somewhat puzzling dichotomy. 187
Sanders came first and held that if officers possessed probable cause to search 
only a container, they had to seize the container and obtain a warrant to search 
it, even if it was located in a vehicle at the time of its seizure. 188 Three years 
later, Ross stood for the broader proposition that a warrantless vehicle search 
on probable cause could extend to any part of the vehicle and to any container 
discovered during that search assuming that the object of the search could be 
concealed inside. 189 Thankfully, the Court was aware of the importance of its 
role as a guide in the area of Fourth Amendment law.190 Instead of simply 
overruling Sanders, Justice Blackmun, through the majority opinion, began 
chipping away at the cardinal principle  that warrantless searches are per se
180 See James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant 
Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1992) ( In this area of Fourth Amendment law, 
the one constant has been dramatic change. ). 
181  500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
182 Id. at 577. 
183 Id. at 576. 
184 Id. at 579. 
185  Tomkovicz, supra note 180, at 1106 ( The only issue actually decided by the Court in 
Acevedo was whether a warrant is needed to search when probable cause is focused solely upon a 
particular container located within a vehicle. ).
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1109 (referring to Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) and United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798 (1982)). 
188 Id. at 1109 (citation omitted). 
189 Id. 
190 See id. at 1111 ( Finally, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the Sanders warrant requirement 
unnecessarily impedes effective law enforcement.  (citation omitted)). 
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unreasonable.191 Because of the Court s own admission192 and the frequency of 
Fourth Amendment issues, it is easy to see why appellate courts should favor 
maximalist decision-making in this area of the law. 
3. Abortion Legislation A New Maximalist Decision Needed to 
Settle Roe?
Healthcare is a third area of the law that implicates other actors  into 
the decision-making rubric of courts. In 1973, the Court in Roe v. Wade
recognized a women s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy  as 
encompassed in the right to privacy in the penumbra of the 14th Amendment
a seemingly maximalist decision.193 Broadly, the Court held that states could 
only prohibit abortion after fetal viability.194 But, the Court did not decide if the 
right was absolute, and it did not resolve the question of when life begins. In this 
sense, it was minimalistic. Overall, Roe was a maximalist decision because it 
expanded the right to privacy and provided a clear test for future courts to rely 
on.195 At the time, Roe seemed to settle the abortion dispute once and for all. 196
Though Planned Parenthood v. Casey197 later changed the method of evaluating 
abortion regulations, Roe s core remained intact.198
However, Roe did not go without criticism.199 Justice Ginsberg and 
Sunstein were among those who were left unsatisfied by the Court s decision.200
The legislatures seem to agree with their evaluation of the case. In the last 
decade, legislation restricting rights and access to abortion has been introduced 
and passed at both state and federal levels at an unprecedented rate. 201
191 Id. at 1112. 
192  California v. Avecedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991) ( [I]t is better to adopt one clear-cut rule 
to govern automobile searches . . . ). 
193  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
194 Id. at 163.
195 See generally id.
196  Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization, and 
the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 69 VAND. L. REV. 935, 
935 (2016). 
197  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
198 Id. at 845 46. 
199  Devins, supra note 196, at 936. 
200 Id. The common criticism of Roe is that the decision unnecessarily perpetuated 
counterproductive, divisive backlash by seeking to short circuit the political process and mandate 
an abortion code generally unacceptable to the nation. Id.
201  Elise Andaya & Joanna Mishtal, The Erosion of Rights to Abortion Care in the United 
States: A Call for a Renewed Anthropological Engagement with the Politics of Abortion, 31 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 40, 40 (2016). 
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Accordingly, over 50% of all U.S. states have imposed some sort of restriction 
on abortion.202 Since 1983, states have increasingly enacted abortion restrictions, 
from a rate of 14 restrictions per year from 1983 2010 to an average of 57 
restrictions per year from 2011 2015.203 In 2007, the Court came out with 
another abortion decision upholding the right to an abortion in some cases, 
requiring access to some procedures to preserve the life and health of the 
woman. 204 Yet, as of 2016, 17 states attempted to overcome this by restricting 
later-term abortions altogether.205 In 2019 alone, seven states adopted abortion 
bans in clear violation of Roe and Casey.206
Roe and Casey ( the abortion cases ) left some questions unanswered. 
The Court declined to say when human life begins.207 Because of this minimalist 
aspect of the abortion cases  opinions, states and other organizations are left on 
their own to answer this question.208 For example, an article in Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly is a call to action  for anthropologists to research and 
enter into the debates around gender and personhood. 209 The recent anti-
abortion movements in the majority of U.S. states 210 have also attempted to 
define personhood and when life begins.211 Nine states have seemingly violated 
the abortion cases and attempted to define a fetus as a person.212 One scholar 
202 Id. at 40 41 (Restrictions can include one or more of the following: (1) impose restrictions 
on abortion providers through the Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws; (2) 
mandate wait times, ultrasound viewings, and/or reading of legislator-written scripts about fetal 
development prior to receiving an abortion; and (3) reduce the gestational age for legal abortion. ). 
203  Rebecca B. Reinhold & Lawrence O. Gostin, State Abortion Restrictions and the New 
Supreme Court: Women’s Access to Reproductive Health Services, 322 J. AM. MED. ASS N 21, 21 
(2019). 
204  Andaya & Mishtal, supra note 201, at 46. 
205 Id.
206  Reinhold & Gostin, supra note 203 (naming Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio). 
207 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
208  Andaya & Mishtal, supra note 201, at 40. Andaya and Mishtal point out that growing 
attention and concern for the effects of medical procedures on the fetus reflect the growing 
popularity of fetal personhood. Id. at 42 ( While not studies of abortion per se, these findings 
underscored how scientific and medical processes are deeply implicated in the cultural construction 
of fetuses as persons with the rights outside of, and even in opposition to, those of pregnant women. 
Assertions about fetal personhood in turn shape the terrain on which arguments about the morality 
of abortion are waged, shaping policy and popular attitudes toward pregnancy and termination. ). 
209  Id. at 40 41. 
210  Id. at 41. 
211  Reinhold & Gostin, supra note 203. 
212 Id. ( Beyond direct abortion regulations, 9 states extend personhood to previable fetuses, 
defining person  to include an unborn child. ). 
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even praised Casey for recalibrating abortion rights  to align with prevailing 
views of popular opinion and elected official preferences. 213
So what historical context is necessary in the area of abortion for a 
maximalist decision to succeed? Looking to the political context, any theory of 
constitutional rights moored to an understanding of the political process must 
take recent developments into account. 214 Particularly for this discussion, it is 
important to realize that today s political dynamic is far different than the 
political dynamic in 1973 (when Roe was decided) or 1992 (when Casey was 
decided). 215 Looking beyond the political system, in a study of reproductive 
governance, some anthropologists seem to think [t]he relationship of abortion 
to modernity was not only a question of demography; many state socialist nations 
also linked the legalization of abortion to the expansion of women s rights. 216
Additional factors include constrained national and familiar economies, 
women s participation in higher education and employment, and changing 
gender and kinship norms,  which fuel desires for smaller families that are 
achieved through both contraception and abortion. 217
Is the historical context of 2020 ready for a maximalist decision?218
Probably not.219 Despite attempts, as of 2016, movements to legally establish 
fetuses as persons from conception have failed in every state where the policy 
has been introduced. 220 Even from the public eye, polls have revealed a slight 
but noticeable decline in support for legal abortion as compared with polls 
conducted two decades ago. 221 Suzanna B. Goldberg, a law professor at 
Columbia, sees it this way, we live in a society that now seems more receptive 
213 Devins, supra note 196, at 937; see generally NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL 
VALUES (1996). 
214  Devins, supra note 196, at 937. Such political developments  in 2016 included party 
polarization and the related rise of the Tea Party  among other things. Id.
215 Id.
216  Andaya & Mishtal, supra note 201, at 42. 
217 Id. at 42 43. 
218  This Note does not intend to predict the likelihood or potential results of overturning Roe.
For such an article, see for example Kimberly Leonard, What Happens If Roe v. Wade Gets 
Overturned?, WASH. EXAM R (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/healthcare/what-happens-if-roe-v-wade-gets-
overturned. See also Reinhold & Gostin, supra note 203. 
219 But see Devins, supra note 196. Devins argues that reliance on the political process is 
misplaced, and the Court is the only actor suitable to settle this dispute. Id. at 936. This Note, 
however, disagrees and argues that when political actors implement the Court s decisions, it is 
necessary to come to more of an agreement before the Court issues a maximalist decision intended 
to be the be all end all.
220  Andaya & Mishtal, supra note 201, at 46. 
221 Id. at 48. 
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to gay rights than women s rights generally. 222 The Court sidestepped 223
significantly interfering with Roe v. Wade, or issued a minimalist opinion, in a 
recent 2019 case.224
If the Supreme Court issues a maximalist decision now, both the Court 
and the decision may face criticism. And, the decision is more likely to be 
overruled in the future. Though, note that a maximalist decision does not require 
overturning the abortion cases. Some scholars actually predict that overturning 
is unlikely, and a significant limit on the precedent is much more likely.225
Perhaps Judge Sutton s strategy is not a bad one here: wait for the states to figure 
it out and determine the best strategy based on that.226 In fact, his criticism of 
Roe is that it decided the issue for the entire country while the country was not 
yet ready for such a defining maximalist decision.227 The states have yet to come 
to a consensus and the consequences are yet to be discovered. Once the dust 
settles, then the Supreme Court may be in a better position to issue a maximalist 
decision that can act as a guide for subsequent cases and state actions. 
Like in Brown, maximalist decisions may be followed by a series of 
minimalist clarifications, but the appropriate use of maximalism is likely to 
increase the use of stare decisis and less likely to increase overturned decisions. 
Applying that reasoning to the current challenges to Roe, it is likely that the Court 
will need to eventually use maximalism to clarify, change, or support Roe, but 
not yet. That decision will come when the historical context is ready, which may 
not be 2020 or even 2021.
B. Mini-Maximalism—The Use of Maximalism After Minimalism 
Sunstein identifies what factors determine when judicial minimalism is 
appropriate, outlined above. However, it is necessary to identify factors that 
determine when a maximalist decision will be effective.228 So, what factors 
222  Adam Liptak, Justices’ Rulings Advance Gays; Women Less So, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/us/as-gays-prevail-in-supreme-court-women-see-
setbacks.html. 
223  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Sidesteps Abortion Question in Ruling on Indiana Law, N.Y.
TIMES (May 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/us/politics/supreme-court-abortion-
indiana.html. 
224 See Box v. Planned Parenthood, 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019). 
225  Reinhold & Gostin, supra note 203. 
226 See generally SUTTON, supra note 52. 
227 Id.
228  An effective maximalist decision provides a clear and just judgment while clarifying the 
law for use in subsequent cases. These maximalist decisions will guide lower courts and reduce or 
eliminate the need for appeals because agreement precedes an effective maximalist decision. 
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should be considered in deciding if a court should use maximalism when issuing 
a decision? 
To start, a court should consider whether information has been gathered. 
A maximalist decision should come after information has been gathered.229
Minimalism is a starting point. Courts should initially embrace minimalism and 
decide cases narrowly until democracy has peaked.230 This means that courts 
address issues of first impression minimalistically, then once uniformity is 
needed and the consequences of an intended strategy have been revealed, 
appellate courts can use their jurisdiction and power to issue maximalist 
decisions. The use of mini-maximalism 231 the path from deciding an issue on 
a case-by-case basis to issuing a broad, guiding decision could strike the 
perfect balance between an increasing caseload and justice in future cases. 
Another factor in deciding whether a maximalist path is appropriate is 
the frequency with which the information will be used. 232 When a topic is 
highly contested by the public, minimalism will provide a more just result,233 at 
the expense of frequent litigation. For example, contention is evident in the area 
of abortion law today. Recent attempts by states to enact strict abortion statutes 
clearly prohibited by Roe and its successors exemplify the need for perhaps 
another maximalist decision in this area of the law.234 It is as simple as this: more 
contention, more cases. Therefore, using a maximalist approach is most effective 
when public agreement and justice align with the judgment rendered. 
Third, the degree of state involvement is a factor in determining if the 
time is right for a maximalist decision. As Judge Sutton points out, if states are 
particularly interested in an issue, they have the power to enact legislation on the 
matter, and if the Supreme Court decides a case against them, then subsequent 
229  In an economic evaluation of rules and standards, Kaplow concludes that [w]hether a law 
should be given content ex ante or ex post involves determining whether information should be 
gathered and processed before or after an individual  act.  Kaplow, supra note 37, at 585. This 
concept is directly analogous to the minimalist/maximalist debate. 
230  The peak of democracy goes something like this: The peak comes when states have been 
laboratories and legislatures have experimented with the issue and attempted to address it. After 
several states have tried various approaches, and the consequences of those actions are known, 
courts can then choose the most effective solution. At this point, issuing minimalist opinions does 
nothing. Maximalist decisions would increase uniformity and hopefully compliance. Powers may 
be abused less, and oversight becomes possible across borders. 
231  Credit to Blake N. Humphrey, 2021 J.D. Candidate at West Virginia University College of 
Law, for the nomenclature. 
232  Kaplow, supra note 37, at 585. 
233 See Beyond Minimalism, supra note 16, at 841 (arguing that [u]sually it would be much 
better to have a just outcome, rejected by many people, than an unjust outcome with which all or 
most agree ). 
234  See infra Section III.C.3 for an analysis of this issue. 
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case law in the lower courts can increase in number.235 State-specific legislation 
results, and national unity is decreased. Therefore, a consideration in determining 
whether a court should use minimalism or maximalism to render an opinion 
should encompass the idea that states can serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 236 If 
state action is preferred, courts should choose minimalism. After states have 
tested a system or theory, then the Supreme Court may adopt a similar approach. 
This allows the Court to render an opinion while already knowing the risks and 
advantages from seeing them play out in the different states.237 Such opinions 
should reduce fear of the unknown for minimalists and also please maximalists 
by allowing for a clear rule that provides guidance to lower courts. On the other 
hand, if a more uniform approach is needed or if a judgment is clearly favored, 
maximalism is the answer. 
1. Recent Title VII Decisions 
The recent cases of Bostock v. Clayton County238 and Our Lady of 
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru239 provide great examples of the need for 
mini-maximalism. First, Bostock lends itself to future litigation and is not the 
maximalist decision to settle all case law in this area. The Court even said that 
itself. On the other hand, Morrissey-Berru might not have been needed if its 
predecessor case had been more clearly defined. Each case is addressed in turn. 
Bostock stems from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
protects employees from discrimination based on their sex.240 In this 
consolidated case,241 Gerald Bostock worked as a child welfare services 
coordinator in Georgia.242 While working there, Gerald started playing in a gay 
recreational softball league.243 After his employer discovered this hobby, 
Gerald s employment was terminated for conduct unbecoming  of its 
235  SUTTON, supra note 52, at 2. 
236  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
237 See generally SUTTON, supra note 52. 
238  140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
239  140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
240  41 U.S.C.A § 2000(e) (West 2020). 
241  Gerald Bostock s case out of the Eleventh Circuit was consolidated with its Second Circuit 
counterpart, Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, 883 F.3d 100 (2018). The case of Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2017), 
was also covered by the Court s decision in Bostock.
242 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
243 Id.
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 123, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol123/iss2/9
2020] MAXIMALIST DECISION MAKING 639 
employees.244 Bostock filed a discrimination suit against his employer soon after 
his termination. Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit agreed that Title 
VII does not support a cause of action for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.245 The issue was then presented to the Supreme Court of the United 
States; does the word sex  in Title VII include sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity?246
The Court answered in the affirmative, seemingly expanding the reach 
of Title VII. The Court had previously addressed what was covered under the 
term sex  in Title VII in a series of three cases.247 In these minimalist cases, the 
court decided that each narrow scenario individually fell under the protection of 
Title VII. Bostock uses and expands these minimalist decisions and is more 
encompassing. The Court acted on its own in expanding the reach of Title VII 
and did not wait for the legislature to explicitly write sexual orientation  into 
Title VII. However, Bostock is not quite a maximalist decision that will prevent 
subsequent litigation. The following excerpt from the Court s opinion addresses 
this concern :
The employers worry that our decision will sweep beyond Title 
VII to other federal or state laws that prohibit sex discrimination. 
And, under Title VII itself, they say sex-segregated bathrooms, 
locker rooms, and dress codes will prove unsustainable after our 
decision today. But none of these other laws are before us; we 
have not had the benefit of adversarial testing about the meaning 
of their terms, and we do not prejudge any such question 
today . . . . Whether other policies and practices might or might 
not qualify as unlawful discrimination or find justifications 
under the provisions of Title VII are questions for future cases, 
not these.248
Employers were obviously concerned about the reach of this decision, 
but the Court expressly limited the reach of its decision. Still, Bostock is more 
than a minimalist decision; it is a step toward maximalism. Considering the 
factors above, perhaps the Court felt comfortable deciding Bostock more broadly 
than the previous trio of cases because, since Title VII s passage, states have 
244 Id. at 1738. 
245 Id. at 1754.
246 Id. at 1739. 
247 See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (extending 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and including same-sex sexual harassment 
under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (including gender stereotyping 
as a form of unlawful discrimination); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) 
(encompassing sexual harassment under Title VII). 
248 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753. 
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provided protections of their own to the LGBTQ+ Community.249 States such as 
California,250 Maryland,251 and Wisconsin252 have explicitly written sexual 
orientation  into their state codes, effectively protecting the class from 
workplace discrimination. 
Bostock seems like a bold, bright-line rule. These state laboratories have 
given the Supreme Court the opportunity to see the consequences of including 
sexual orientation as a protected class; information was gathered before the Court 
expanded protection. The creation and enactment of state legislation also 
represents the high level of interest in this topic. Whether intended or not, 
Bostock increased national unity and exemplifies the use of and need for mini-
maximalism. The trio of cases preceding Bostock were minimalist decisions 
which laid the foundation for the Court to issue broader decisions. Though 
Bostock is not the maximalist decision to end all future litigation, it is a first step 
to increasing the reach of case law to decrease future case load. 
As another example of the need for maximalism, Morrissey-Berru,
might not have been needed if its predecessor case had been more clearly 
defined. Morrissey-Berru concerns the ministerial exception to federal anti-
discrimination laws.253 This was not the first case to address this exception, 
though. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission254 first recognized an exception for 
ministers, preventing religious institutions from being subjected to anti-
discrimination laws when hiring ministers.255 The Court in Hosanna-Tabor
familiarly limited the scope of its decision and was explicitly reluctant to adopt 
a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. 256
Because the Court chose minimalism in 2012, it had to interpret who qualifies as 
a minister in its 2020 Morrissey-Berru decision. The Court in this later decision 
ultimately followed and expanded its approach in Hosanna-Tabor by granting 
the Our Lady Guadalupe School an exception to anti-discrimination laws, 
classifying Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru as a minister.257 Once enough 
minimalist decisions build to create enough case law to provide a just result in 
249  By 2019, 21 states had included LGBT employees as a protected class for employees. 
Katherine Carter, Questioning the Definition of “Sex” in Title VII: Bostock v. Clayton County, 
GA, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL Y SIDEBAR 59, 59 (2020). 
250 CAL. GOV T CODE § 12940 (West 2020). 
251  MD. CODE ANN. § 20-601(h) (West 2020). 
252 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (West 2020). 
253  140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
254  565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
255 Id.
256 Id. at 190. 
257 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2066. 
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all similar cases, a maximalist decision simplifies and decreases appellate courts
caseloads. 
C. The Numbers 
In general, the number of cases commenced in federal trial courts in the 
United States has steadily increased since the early 1900s.258 Even as late as 
1970, the number of private suits commenced in federal district courts registered 
well below 100,000 cases; in fact, only 62,356 cases were reported.259 There was 
a rapid increase in the next 15 years with the caseload almost doubling; in 1985, 
156,182 private suits were commenced in federal district courts in the United 
States.260 Another 15 years passed, and in 2000, an even higher 188,408 
commenced cases were reported.261 In the latest 15-year interval, 237,453 cases 
were reported in 2015.262
Why are these numbers important? If these numbers continue to 
increase, courts will need a different approach to effectively deal with the 
increasing number of cases. At the trial court level, these numbers could be 
affected by new technology or the increasing population. Such problems creating 
litigation often cannot be solved in advance. Courts can, however, implement 
maximalist decision making to minimize the number of cases that could be 
solved by previous decisions of the court. 
If uncertainty is left unresolved at the appellate level, lower courts are 
left without guidance, only having narrow and shallow precedent which can 
hardly be classified as binding. Case-by-case decision making does nothing to 
help the next court and the next case down the line. Minimalists are concerned 
about the costs of error, but their actions drive up the cost of making future 
decisions. Trial courts alone cannot set binding precedent, which is needed for 
an effective maximalist decision to decrease the number of subsequent cases 
dealing with a particular matter. Thus, appellate courts must be involved. 
The statistics from United States Courts of Appeals are even more 
interesting. From its origins in the late 1800s until the 1960s, the caseload of the 
courts of appeals steadily increased.263 From the 1960s until the mid-2000s, there 
was a rapid increase in cases commenced in federal courts of appeals.264 In 2005, 
258 Trial Court Caseloads Since 1870, FED. JUD. CTR., 
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the number of cases commenced peaked at 68,472 up more than 17 times from 
the 3,899 cases commenced in 1960.265 If this number continues to increase as 
the trend indicates,266 a solution is necessary. That solution is properly implicated 
judicial maximalism. 
Maximalism is not appropriate when courts are addressing issues of first 
impression. But maximalism is especially appropriate in areas of the law in 
which other actors rely on the judiciary to output clear, helpful guidelines which 
must be followed. When justices output judgments with a very shallow opinion,
those opinions do not set broadly applicable precedent. This creates more work 
for lower courts because shallow opinions do not decide the next constitutional 
challenge within the same subject. The lack of case law that applies across a 
subject impedes a timely resolution of subsequent cases and further slows the 
wheels of justice. A maximalist decision allows progression among a subject and 
efficiency among lower courts. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In some cases, minimalism is a starting point. But eventually, an answer 
with some finality is necessary. That answer comes in the form of a maximalist 
decision. A maximalist decision clarifies existing case law, while preventing the 
need for further case law on the topic at hand. In other cases, maximalism is 
called for to clarify and broadly interpret the law so that other actors outside the 
judiciary can appropriately abide by it. While not all challenges can be prevented 
or even foreseen, maximalism may help address the growing number of suits 
commenced in United States federal courts. The scope of a decision can increase 
or decrease the number of subsequent cases. Maximalists take the better 
approach when it comes to the scope of an opinion. Minimalists focus so much 
on narrowing the scope that future case law suffers. 
There are certainly exceptions to this rule. Maximalism in some cases 
may create more of a need to overturn case law when the historical climate 
changes, though maximalists do generally adhere more strongly to stare decisis 
than do case-by-case minimalists. Minimalism provides a less specific but 
perhaps better suited answer to individual, quirky  legal questions. Yet, 
maximalism provides more transparency and more guidance to lower courts on 
subsequent cases within the realm of the maximalist decision, thus decreasing 
the need for appeals and potentially even the number of cases filed by providing 
clearer guidance to the public. In advocating for maximalism, it is important to 
265 Id. 
266 Id. Though, after its peak in 2005, the caseload of courts of appeals has appeared to decrease. 
This Note assumes that the peak may be followed by a short decrease but will eventually continue 
the exponential climb toward a steadily increasing caseload following the long-term trend rather 
than the short-term. 
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remember Anderson s distinction267 that minimalism, or maximalism, ideally 
only affects opinions and not judgments. Therefore, the outcome remains the 
same in each individual case, but the process becomes more efficient with the 
use of a correctly timed maximalist decision. 
Lauren Cyphers*
267 See supra Part II. 
 * J.D. Candidate, West Virginia University College of Law, 2021; Bachelor of Science in 
Mathematics, West Virginia University Eberly College of Arts and Sciences, 2018; Executive 
Editor, Volume 123 of the West Virginia Law Review. The Author would like to thank her peers 
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